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Tunc ille, turbatus revertens domum, philosophiam profiteri voluit,  
futurus sed verus philosophus Christi. 
 
“Then he, completely shaken up and returning home, wished to profess philosophy, but instead 
would become a true philosopher of Christ.”1 
 
 This line from Paulinus’ early fifth-century biography of Ambrose of Milan poses the 
question that has shaped my line of inquiry in this thesis: how do early Christian authors interact 
with Roman intellectual culture? In this excerpt, Ambrose is pulled between the Roman culture 
of which he is an elite member and the Christian community that is calling him to serve as 
bishop of Milan. He wishes to pursue classical philosophy but is denied this desire. Instead, 
Ambrose takes up an alternate identity as a verus philosophus Christi, or “true philosopher of 
Christ.” By setting up a dichotomy between philosophy and Christian philosophy, Paulinus 
reveals an underlying tension between the classical and Christian cultures during Ambrose’s 
career in the fourth century.  
 Ambrose was a fully inducted member of both Roman and Christian cultures. Through 
his education in paideia, the intellectual culture reserved for elite men in the Roman Empire, 
Ambrose wielded great social and political capital. He enjoyed a successful political career and 
rose to the rank of provincial governor by 374. Soon after he became governor, Ambrose was 
ordained as the bishop of Milan. Due in part to Constantine’s Edict of Milan in 313, Christianity 
underwent a rapid transformation in the fourth century from an oft-persecuted minority group to 
one with increasing power within the Empire, and the role of bishop entailed both religious and 
civic influence. Ambrose rose to power in both spheres of influence within the Roman Empire. 
                                               
1 Paulinus, Vita Sancti Ambrosii, 3.7. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
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In Chapter One, I explore the ways these two cultures of paideia and Christianity overlap and 
compete with each other in the fourth century. 
 In the remaining three chapters, I use the first book of Ambrose’s De Officiis as a case 
study through which I focus my questions about his his dual identity as educated elite and 
Christian leader. Ambrose models his De Officiis off of Cicero’s text of the same name. Both 
versions of the De Officiis are philosophical treatises that set up a system of ethics, and both 
authors build off of the Middle Stoic philosopher Panaetius’ περὶ τοῦ καθἠκοντος, or “About 
Ethics.” Because Ambrose explicitly references Cicero’s text in his own Christian version, his 
De Officiis offers fruitful ground for exploring the interactions between Christian authors and 
classical culture. 
I have organized my three chapters on the De Officiis thematically, and all three of my 
themes can be pulled out of the rest of Paulinus’ “true philosopher of Christ” passage. After 
identifying Ambrose as a Christian philosopher, the biographer explains what this hybrid role 
looks like: 
Qui contemptis saecularibus pompis piscatorum secuturus esset vestigial, qui Christo 
populos congregarunt non fucis verborum sed simplici sermone et verae fidei ratione; 
missi sine pera sine virga etiam ipsos philosophos converterunt. 
 
[One] who, because he held the excesses of the age in contempt, would succeed the 
fishermen who gathered people to Christ, not with ornamentation of words but with 
simple speech and the argument of true faith; these men, having been sent without a 
wallet, without a walking stick, converted even the philosophers themselves.2 
 
In the passage, Paulinus lays out Jesus’ disciples as exemplary figures for Ambrose to follow as 
he leads the Milanese church. These idealized attitudes and actions provide the jumping off 
points for each of my chapters on Ambrose’s De Officiis.  
                                               
2 Paulinus, Vita Sancti Ambrosii, 3.7. 
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 That Ambrose communicates “not with ornamentation of words but with simple speech 
and the argument of true faith” is the topic of Chapter Two. In this chapter, I perform a textual 
comparison between Ambrose’s introduction to his De Officiis and its Ciceronian counterpart. 
Just as Paulinus describes the fishermen-models of the true philosopher, Ambrose claims to 
speak simply and without the decorative trappings that Cicero is known for. As Ambrose both 
conforms to and diverges from Cicero’s De Officiis, he expresses his identity as an educated 
Christian author. 
 Paulinus’ claim that Jesus’ disciples “converted even the philosophers themselves” falls 
in the same vein as Ambrose’s discussion of classical philosophy in his De Officiis. Chapter 
Three analyzes Ambrose’s multivalent attitude towards the philosophers. He claims that the 
ideas he agrees with are first found in the Bible and only secondarily belong to Greek and 
Roman thinkers. Whenever he disagrees with a philosophy, he condemns it and offers a far 
superior Christian alternative. In this way, Ambrose performs Paulinus’ conversion of the 
philosophers long after they have died. 
 Finally, Paulinus’ description of the disciples as holding “the excesses of the age in 
contempt,” “gather[ing] people to Christ,” and doing so “without a wallet, without a walking 
stick” capture many aspects of Ambrose’s complicated attitude towards wealth, social status, and 
common people. In Chapter Four, I take up Peter Brown’s label of “Christian populism” to 
describe this web of attitudes while calling for a more nuanced reading of Ambrose’s text than 
Brown’s framework allows. Despite an idealization of poverty and simple living, Ambrose is 
himself highly privileged and expects leaders of the church to act in accordance with the 
standards of elite Roman society. It is when his elite status comes into conflict with his populist 
and egalitarian Christian values that Ambrose’s complex identity comes further into focus.  

Chapter One: Pagan Paideia and Christian Culture  
 
The English word “pagan” derives from the Latin paganus, which literally means “rustic” 
or “from the countryside.” This original definition is alien to the 21st century English speaker, for 
whom “pagan” holds negative connotations with witchcraft and the occult. How then did the 
neutral paganus become used to describe a negative “other?” Roman Christians began to refer to 
all non-Christians and non-Jews as pagani in the fourth century.3 After nearly three hundred 
years spent amid Roman culture, what caused fourth-century Christians to create a label for 
everyone outside of their own religious community? The fourth century in Rome was a time of 
dramatic political change, social upheaval, and shifting religious landscapes. These contextual 
elements combine to create an ideal environment in which Christianity could define its own 
cultural identity and contrast it with the identities of other religious traditions. In particular, 
fourth century Christians used both the content and techniques of pagan paideia, or educational 
culture, as a tool to support the formation of a communal Christian identity.4 
Political, Social, and Religious Context of the Fourth Century  
The Roman Empire underwent dramatic political change throughout the fourth century. 
Under Diocletian’s tetrarchy, from 293 to 305, Christianity was persecuted as a way of 
promoting Roman traditional culture.5 After Diocletian’s abdication, the institution of the 
tetrarchy began to disintegrate, and several years of conflict among the tetrarchs resulted in 
                                               
3 Christopher P. Jones, “The Fuzziness of ‘Paganism,’” Common Knowledge 18, no. 2 (2012): 250, doi: 
10.1215/0961754X-1544932. 
4 This chapter is adapted from the term paper I wrote in the fall of 2017 for CLAS401, the required senior 
seminar for Classics majors at Trinity College. 
5 Raymond P. Davis, “Diocletian,” in Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. Simon Hornblower and Antony 
Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) doi: 10.1093/acref/9780198606413.001.0001. 
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Constantine taking control of the Roman Empire in 312.6 In 313, Constantine issued the Edict of 
Milan, which instituted religious tolerance for Christianity within the Empire.7 Although this 
declaration by no means transformed the Roman Empire into a Christian nation, the Edict of 
Milan reversed Diocletian’s oppressive measures against Christianity.8 Throughout the political 
changes of the fourth century, the Empire remained consistently authoritarian: “Imperial 
government in [the fourth century] was unmatched in Graeco-Roman history in its scale and 
complexity of organization, in its physical incidence upon society, the rhetorical extravagance 
with which it expressed, and the calculated violence with which it attempted to impose its will.”9 
Even in times of relative political stability, the Roman Empire of the fourth century created a 
landscape of imposing control and even violence. Any man who desired political power during 
this time period needed to navigate a delicate system in which an individual’s fortune depended 
on the good favor of more influential men. 
One of the ways in which Roman men negotiated power in the fourth century was 
through paideia. Paideia originated in Greek culture, and Libanius, a fourth century rhetorician 
from Antioch, describes it as an induction into civic responsibility: “[The educated man] will 
think that his duty is to make the cities happy; he will rejoice when the executioner’s sword lies 
idle; he will make the citadels beautiful with buildings; and he will remain throughout a servant 
                                               
6 Raymond P. Davis, “Constantine I, ‘the Great,’” in Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. Simon Hornblower 
and Antony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) doi: 10.1093/acref/9780198606413.001.0001. 
7 Luke Timothy Johnson, Among the Gentiles: Greco-Roman Religion and Christianity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 256. 
8 Johnson, 256. 
9 John Matthews, The Roman Empire of Ammianus (London: Duckworth, 1989), 253. 
 13 
of the Muses.”10 For Libanius, paideia creates model citizens who care about the state of their 
city, strive for peace, fund public works, and pursue the life of the mind. A Roman education 
emphasized the use of language: “Typically that schooling was purely literary […]: mastery of 
correct language, command of a fairly small number of classical texts, and an ability to turn the 
knowledge of language and literature to a facility in composition and speech.”11 The full use of 
paideia required both an understanding of literary content and skill in writing and public 
speaking. The mastery that Robert Kaster describes here involves intimate knowledge and 
internalization of the curriculum of paideia.  
In addition to cultivating a particular type of knowledge, paideia distinguished elite men 
from their uneducated counterparts. Because both the cost of hiring grammarians and 
rhetoricians as teachers and the investment of time and intellectual work required to learn the 
skills of paideia prohibited the majority of Roman youths from becoming part of the educated 
culture, paideia functioned as a marker of class distance.12 Peter Brown notes that even once the 
hurdles to acquire paideia had been overcome, a Roman man could only demonstrate his 
newfound culture in a small set of circumstances and through a limited range of conventional 
expression.13 The class marker of paideia primarily communicated status to others who had been 
educated in the same way.  
                                               
10 Libanius, Epistles, 1261.4, quoted in Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion, 38. 
11 Robert Kaster, Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 11.  
12 Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 39. 
13 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 39. 
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In a time of political uncertainty in Rome, the structure of paideia provided a system to 
control social mobility and understand the ways that classes relate to each other.14 Paideia 
created a sense of social cohesion between elite men across the empire: “A late Roman education 
produced remarkable cultural homogeneity. […] Ever since the early empire, a common culture 
had provided a language that enabled members of the educated classes from as far apart as Arles 
and Arabia to meet as equal devotees of Greek rhetoric.”15 Paideia both distinguished learned 
men from their illiterate counterparts and united them with other men who had, as Libanius 
describes, “installed Demosthenes in [their] soul.”16 By connecting paideia to the soul, Libanius 
makes an external social institution seem like a defining internal quality, which further justifies 
the class differences expressed through educational culture in late antique Rome. 
A correlated function of paideia in the fourth century was its use as an accessory to 
political power. Because paideia was linked with class difference, Roman elites used it to justify 
their inherent right to political authority over the uneducated masses.17 In addition to supporting 
a sense of natural right to rule over lower classes, paideia allowed Roman elites with varying 
spheres of power across the empire to negotiate their relationships with each other. By appealing 
to paideia, an elite man in a Roman province could successfully interact with a governor, despite 
the latter’s possession of the political upper hand.18 Because the structure of the Roman Empire 
                                               
14 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 39.  
15 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 39. 
16 Libanius, Ep. 1261.2, quoted in Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion, 38. 
17 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 42. 
18 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 42. 
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was increasingly fragile in the fourth century, elites relied on paideia more than ever to maintain 
the existing systems of power:  
Politics and paideia were so strenuously linked in the fourth and fifth centuries because 
there was no guarantee that the tacit agreement which ensured the effectiveness of 
rhetoric would remain operative. Once there was a danger that the common code of 
formalized speech, and all that this stood for, might be brushed aside, the notables of the 
Greek world had to face a degree of vulnerability to the power of the emperor and his 
servants…19 
 
Under an authoritarian empire, Roman elites and their counterparts in the Greek East relied on a 
mutual concern for paideia to protect them from the most powerful players in society, including 
the emperor. Even though Brown is perhaps overzealous in his discussion of paideia’s role in the 
power dynamics of fourth century Rome, his identification of the link between paideia and 
political influence is helpful. 
 In addition to allowing elites to interact well with each other, fourth century Romans 
viewed paideia as a tempering force for the authoritarian power of the emperor. In the second 
half of the third century, the Egyptian grammarian Lollianus complimented the emperors 
Gallienus and Valerian: “Your heavenly magnanimity and your fellowship with the Muses (for 
Paideia sits beside you on the throne) have given me confidence to offer a just and lawful 
petition.”20 Lollianus cites paideia as the reason that he has faith in the justice of the two 
emperors. Having an education in common secures the interaction between Roman elites at 
different levels of political power—Lollianus was just a scholar of grammar, but his possession 
of paideia puts him on an even intellectual playing field with the leaders of the Roman Empire. 
In contrast, the Christian author Gregory Nazianzen expressed concern about the later emperor 
                                               
19 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 43. 
20 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 35.  
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Julian. Julian was skilled in his use of paideia, but Gregory feared that he had not fully “installed 
paideia in his soul” because he looked restless and laughed at odd moments.21 Time spent 
learning paideia was not enough to create a good emperor; he must allow paideia to tame every 
aspect of his personality, even his physical expressions. 
 The shifting landscape of fourth century Rome created a unique moment for Christianity 
and its development of a religious identity. When Constantine took the throne, he did not support 
Christianity only through the granting of legal recognition in the Edict of Milan. Rather, 
throughout his reign he acted as a patron of the Church by funding basilicas, commissioning 
copies of the Bible, establishing Sunday as a holy day throughout the empire, and founding a 
new Christian city at Constantinople.22 Furthermore, Constantine called to order the Council of 
Nicaea in 325, which was the first ecumenical gathering of Christian leaders in an attempt to 
reach consensus on matters of orthodoxy. Despite the imperial support for Christianity during the 
first half of the fourth century, the majority of the empire continued to practice traditional Greco-
Roman religion.23  
Even though Rome did not become an empire populated by Christians under 
Constantine’s rule, his support of the Church caused a dramatic shift in the social status of 
Christianity. Under Diocletian, Christianity had not only lacked legal recognition but was 
persecuted by the state. Constantine’s reign brought both political legitimacy and an increase of 
social power to the Church. Luke Johnson writes: “Christians moved from a place of hiding to a 
posture of display, from a condition in which their property could be dispossessed to a condition 
                                               
21 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 60. 
22 Johnson, 256. 
23 Johnson, 256. 
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in which property was bestowed on them, from a marginal to a central social status […]. History 
has known few such profound reversals of fortune.”24 The total reversal of fortunes which 
Christianity underwent in the fourth century created an environment where the Church was 
suddenly free to construct new definitions of what it meant to be a Christian, both in terms of 
right belief—orthodoxy—and right practice—orthopraxy.25 The emergence of ecumenical 
councils in the fourth century demonstrates this desire to draw boundaries around Christian 
identity in an official capacity, but individual Christian writers also expressed increasingly 
detailed opinions about what Christians believe and what Christians do.26 The change in status 
that Christianity experienced in the fourth century allowed the Church to pursue more explicitly 
a cohesive Christian identity. 
Scholarly Consensus: A Shifting Landscape of Identity Definition 
Scholarship surrounding fourth-century Rome has shifted dramatically in the last fifty 
years. In the tradition of Edward Gibbon’s influential six-volume work The History of the 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), historians have often marked the history of Rome 
in the third century CE and following with deterioration: “If a man were called to fix the period 
in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and 
prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to 
the accession of Commodus.”27 By claiming universal agreement on the second century as the 
                                               
24 Johnson, 258. 
25 Johnson, 271. 
26 Johnson, 272. 
27 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. D.M. Low (New York: Harcourt, 1960).  
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golden age of not only Rome, but of the entire world, Gibbon framed the discussion of the later 
Empire as one of stagnation and decline.  
This perspective continued to be dominant among classicists and ancient historians for 
two centuries until Peter Brown revolutionized the way that this era is understood. In the wake of 
Brown’s 1971 re-articulation of the period as “late antiquity,” classicists have begun to look at 
the third through eighth centuries as a dynamic time of political, cultural, and religious change 
and growth in the Roman Empire.28 Because of the scholarly revolution of the past fifty years, 
many points of consensus among modern scholars of late antiquity would have been unpopular 
or even unvoiced of in the era of Gibbon’s influence. Concerning the interaction between 
Christians, pagans, and both groups’ use of paideia, scholars agree that fourth century Rome was 
characterized by dramatic changes in power dynamics and the overlapping of both Christian and 
Greco-Roman religion, which led to increased definition of group identities. 
Contemporary scholars concur that Christianity did undergo a “profound reversal of 
fortunes,” as Luke Johnson suggests.29 Peter Brown argues that Constantine’s public political 
alignment with Christianity not only changed the social position of individual Christians, but also 
the relationship of the whole empire to its provincial subjects:  
The Christian court offered a new, empire-wide patriotism. This was centered on the 
person and mission of a God-given, universal ruler, whose vast and profoundly abstract 
care for the empire as a whole made the older loyalties to individual cities, that had been 
wholeheartedly expressed in the old, polytheistic system, seem parochial and trivial.30  
 
                                               
28 Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, (New York: Harcourt, 1971). 
29 Johnson, 258. 
30 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 19. 
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Brown suggests that the change in political status of Christians and the rule of a nominally 
Christian emperor transformed the Roman understanding of what empire entails; what was 
formerly a collection of individual cities governed from Rome became a cohesive nation with an 
almost pastoral ruler. Constantine transformed Christianity from a persecuted minority religion 
to a legally recognized and imperially endorsed system of patriotic belief.  
Marcel Simon adds to this discussion of the shifting Christian position of the fourth 
century, noting that it is only this transformation that makes a discussion about the overlap of 
pagan paideia and Christian culture possible:  
At first sight, and if we take into account the actual relationship between the ancient 
Church and the pagan world, from the beginnings of the Christian era onwards to 
Diocletian, we might feel tempted to conclude that, undeniably, those two confronted 
forces had nothing in common at all. The opposition between them—even if we leave 
aside the phases, in fact comparatively short, of violent and general persecution—cannot 
be ignored.31  
 
Simon argues that, even if Christian persecution under Diocletian is put aside, Christianity had 
been at odds with Greco-Roman society for centuries, which makes the comparison of Christian 
practice and Greco-Roman religion seem difficult. The reversal of fortunes for Christianity in the 
fourth century eases this tension between Roman society, and consequently the paideia it 
produces, and the Church. 
 A further point of consensus among scholars is that the newfound social capital of 
Christianity under Constantine did not translate into a dramatic increase in practicing Christians. 
Brown argues, “Fourth century Christianity, in fact, was far from being a ‘popular’ movement. It 
is not certain that it had become the majority religion of any one region before the conversion of 
                                               
31 Marcel Simon, “Christianity and Pagan Thought: Confluences and Conflicts,” Religious Studies 9, no. 4 
(Dec. 1973): 386.  
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Constantine in 312, still less that it appealed to any broad stratum of the population.”32 Although 
Brown does note that Christianity began to grow among Roman elites towards the end of the 
fourth century, he rejects the idea that the legal toleration of Christianity by Constantine led to a 
sudden “Christianization” of the Roman people.33 In the same vein, Johnson points to the 
emperor Julian’s return of the empire to “pagan supremacy” in 362 and 363 as an indicator of the 
general population’s opinion of traditional Roman religion:  
A significant portion, perhaps a majority, of the population of the empire probably 
remained pagan for a substantial period of time. Temples to the gods continued to exist, 
and worship of the gods continued to thrive. Eloquent spokespersons defended the glories 
of Greco-Roman religion and philosophy against the newly privileged but still barbaric 
Christian interloper.34  
 
Not only did Christianity not absorb traditional “pagan” religion when it became legally 
recognized, but some pagans actively preached against the Church and its growth. At the same 
time that Christianity gained significant political power, the empire itself remained dominated by 
traditional Greco-Roman religion. The current scholarly understanding of the complicated 
dynamic between Christianity’s cultural growth but persistent minority status continues to push 
back against Gibbon’s simplistic description of Christianization within his narrative of decline 
and fall at Rome.  
 Because Greco-Religion religion maintained popularity throughout the fourth century, 
scholars agree that Christian culture and “pagan” culture were frequently indistinguishable. 
Roman Christians all grew up in a world saturated by traditional Roman culture—when 
Christianity was a minority religion, most Christians’ neighbors, business partners, and local 
                                               
32 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 76. 
33 Brown, Power and Persuasion, 76. 
34 Johnson, 256-257. 
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authorities were pagans. Johnson argues that “Christianity was a ‘Greco-Roman religion’ 
virtually from the start and grew increasingly closer to the forms and expressions of religion 
found in the Greco-Roman environment. Rather than a foreign and forced imposition, the Greco-
Roman character of Christianity was a natural development that required no external or political 
assistance.”35 Because Christians in the Roman empire were Greco-Roman, it follows that their 
expression of Christianity would also be distinctly Greco-Roman in flavor. Simon agrees, writing 
“The best in [paganism], as regards forms of thought, was integrated into Christianity so 
intimately that even now there are still controversies about the heritage and legitimacy of the 
association.”36 Because Christianity grows and develops in the Greco-Roman milieu, it naturally 
appears similar to Greco-Roman religious traditions in some ways.  
 Because of the proximity between Christianity and the pagan culture in which it 
develops, there is scholarly consensus that elite Christians in the fourth century made use of the 
culture of paideia. As Peter Brown argues, this is particularly true of Christian men whose 
writings became influential within the empire: “Christian writers of the fourth and fifth centuries 
wielded with dazzling effect the rhetoric of paradox […] It was an open secret that many 
Christian bishops owed their prestige in society at large to the fact that they had once been 
rhetors.”37 Although paideia’s centuries-long existence was firmly rooted in a non-Christian 
culture, influential Christians skillfully employed Roman educational culture as a way to gain 
power within society. Not only did Christians use paideia for its secular benefits, but some 
Christian authors cited it as a positive form of spiritual training, including Gregory Nazianzen: 
                                               
35 Johnson, 255-256. 
36 Simon, 398. 
37 Brown, 74-75. 
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“With measured words, I learned to bridle rage.”38 Gregory reinterprets the outward composure 
and guidelines of comportment of paideia as a way of correcting an internal expression of sin. 
Christian authors employed the rhetorical training of paideia regardless their personal 
opinions of it. Even Tertullian, who expressed concern about the pagan origins of paideia, relied 
on it in his own writing. He writes, “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? […] We 
need not be concerned to know anything but Jesus Christ, in quest of anything but the Gospel.”39 
Tertullian argues that paideia is irrelevant to the Christian because it does not provide knowledge 
of Christ. However, Simon notes Tertullian’s extensive use of rhetoric, which is learned through 
paideia: “[rhetoric is] a field, by the way, in which even he [Tertullian] proves to be dependent 
of Graeco-Roman culture.”40 Simon’s observation of Tertullian’s simultaneous rejection of and 
reliance on paideia highlights the bipartite nature of education as mastery of both content and a 
set of skills.  This dual form of paideia as both substance and a technology for making use of this 
substance lies at the heart of Tertullian’s, and indeed Christianity’s, ambivalent interaction with 
Roman educational culture. The tools of rhetoric prove indispensable to the process of 
proclaiming the gospel throughout the Empire, but authors like Tertullian grow uncomfortable 
with the non-Christian content used to teach rhetoric. Although early Christian authors talk about 
paideia in drastically different ways, classicists agree that the tool of paideia was regularly used 
by influential Christians in late antiquity. 
 Finally, the scholarship which I have read in the course of my research agrees that 
Christian authors in the fourth century demonstrated an increasing desire to distance Christianity 
                                               
38 Brown, 50. 
39 Simon, 385.  
40 Simon, 386.  
 23 
from the pagan culture it inhabited. Even though Christianity was still a minority religion during 
the fourth century, Peter Brown observes that Christian writers of this time period conceived of 
themselves as engaging in a form of culture war and emerging victorious:  
It is just at this time that the more aggressively populist components of the Christian 
representation of the triumph of the church reached their peak. […] It was essential to 
invoke such themes in order to challenge, in as dramatic a manner as possible, the 
monopoly of culture associated with traditional non-Christian leaders.41 
 
Because of the cultural predominance of Greco-Roman religion and the promise of power under 
the reign of Constantine, fourth century Christians felt the need to push back against the pagan 
traditions of the Roman empire.  
 In the upcoming chapters, I continue to explore the dynamics between paideia, 
Christianity, and identity navigation through a case study of Ambrose’s De Officiis. His positions 
of power both within the Church and in the political structure of the Empire, as well as the 
classical framework of his text, make him a particularly enlightening example of the complex 
tensions at play in fourth-century Rome.  
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Chapter Two: A Tale of Two De Officiis 
 
While paideia manifests itself in many different situations as a flag of social status and 
identity, its most direct impact on the lives of its inductees is in the use of the written and spoken 
word. Therefore, when considering Ambrose’s interaction with paideia and the classical culture 
it transmits, the textuality of his De Officiis provides a natural starting point for inquiry. In the 
opening chapters of Book 1 of De Officiis, Ambrose claims that his words are not marked by 
supellectilem neque artem dicendi, or “ornamentation or skill of speaking,” but are instead 
simple expressions of truth.42 This point puts Ambrose’s De Officiis into dialogue with Cicero’s 
text of the same name, because it directly references Cicero’s acclaimed rhetorical style. 
Throughout the introduction of his De Officiis, Ambrose’s literary choices engage him in a push 
and pull relationship with Cicero and the culture of paideia that he represents.  
Ambrose’s Literary Relationship to Cicero 
Although Ambrose does not name Cicero as one of his predecessors until 1.24, he makes 
it clear throughout his text that he is writing with the great republican orator in mind. As Ivor 
Davidson argues, even Ambrose’s preamble in 1.1-22, which scholars have at times cast aside as 
an unrelated sermon that was interjected into the text to fill space, echoes Cicero’s text in its 
structure, style, and content.43 When Ambrose finally mentions Cicero by name in 1.24, he does 
so in a twofold way. First, he names him among quidam philosophiae studentes, or “other 
                                               
42 Ambrose, De Officiis, 1.29.  
43 Ivor Davidson, “A Tale of Two Approaches: Ambrose, De Officiis 1.1-22 and Cicero, De Officiis, 1.1-6,” 
The Journal of Theological Studies 52, no. 1 (2001): 66. Davidson has been one of the only scholars to write about 
Ambrose’s De Officiis in the past twenty-five years, and his introduction, text, translation, and commentary of this 
text are indispensable resources. As such, I refer to Davidson frequently throughout this chapter. 
 26 
scholars of philosophy” including the Greek Stoic Panaetius.44 Cicero comes last in this list of 
philosophers, and Ambrose chooses to refer to him by his nomen, or family name, Tullius. 
Although this use of a generic name and delayed placement of Cicero within a list of his 
philosophical forerunners might suggest that he played a lesser role in the development of 
Ambrose’s own work, Cicero receives a second billing in the following sentence: Et sicut Tullius 
ad erudiendum filium, ita ego quoque ad vos informandos filios meos, (“and just as Tullius did 
for the education of his son, so also I do for the shaping of you all, my sons”).45 While Ambrose 
downplays the importance of Cicero in the first sentence of 1.24, his repeated reference to Cicero 
in the second sentence solidifies Cicero’s role as an exemplary philosophical writer upon whom 
Ambrose bases his own writing. Et sicut makes it clear that Ambrose seeks to write in the same 
vein as Cicero; he does not claim to write “just like” Panaetius or any of the other philosophiae 
studentes.  
The parallels between the two versions of De Officiis, as well as Ambrose’s repeated 
reference to Cicero as a philosophical role model, demonstrate that Ambrose wrote the 
introduction to his text with Cicero’s text in mind, though perhaps not physically in front of 
him.46 As Robert Kaster writes, elite education in late antiquity consisted of three goals: 
“mastery of correct language, command of a fairly small number of classical texts, and an ability 
to turn the knowledge of language and literature to a facility in composition and speech.”47 The 
final goal of adapting knowledge to aid elite Roman men in their political, social, and literary 
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pursuits demands an intimate understanding of the set curriculum. The education of paideia is 
intended to serve a utilitarian purpose, and because of this purpose, literary texts become tools 
that a young man can use throughout his life to garner social status or political power. Cicero 
was undoubtedly one of the authors featured in late antique Roman education, and his De Officiis 
was one of the texts commonly included on reading lists.48 By participating in the culture of 
paideia, Ambrose had certainly studied and internalized Cicero’s ethical text. The plethora of 
references and similarities to Cicero’s text in Ambrose’s work does not necessarily mean that he 
was working off of a physical copy of the earlier De Officiis, but rather confirms that Ambrose 
was a fully inducted member of paideia. 
Because of Cicero’s prominence in Roman culture, Ambrose’s engagement with Cicero 
reflects his relationship with classical culture in general. Part of the unifying power of induction 
into paideia was the curricular emphasis on a few prominent authors, including Homer, 
Demosthenes, Virgil, and Cicero.49 Partaking in elite Roman society in late antiquity meant 
knowing Cicero. In the four-hundred-year period between Cicero’s De Officiis and Ambrose’s 
text of the same name, Cicero had become synonymous with being a cultured member of 
paideia. Davidson calls the fourth century “the aetas Ciceroniana of later Latin” because of the 
defining influence of Cicero’s work.50 Since Cicero and his work stand so clearly as symbols of 
classical Roman intellectual culture in the fourth century, Cicero himself becomes elided into the 
broader system of paideia in Ambrose’s text. The ways Ambrose interacts with Cicero’s text 
reflect his interaction with all of pagan Roman culture. Ambrose’s De Officiis acts as a 
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microcosm through which the dynamics of the larger cultural struggle between Christianity and 
classical culture can be seen.  
Comparing Cicero and Ambrose: Close Readings 
When Ambrose and Cicero’s De Officiis are read in conjunction, significant similarities 
are disrupted by points of difference. That Ambrose diverts from Cicero’s model at all is more 
indicative of his relationship to classical culture than the places in the text where he conforms. 
As Peter Brown describes, “A late Roman education produced remarkable cultural homogeneity. 
[…] Formalized, elevated, reassuringly predictable, and invariably fulsome, rhetoric provided a 
permanent background music to the consensus in favor of Roman rule.”51 Elite education’s 
ability to provide social and political power rests in its drive for cohesion. Paideia is designed to 
produce elite men who are good citizens within the Empire. Ambrose, an inductee into paideia, 
could be expected to conform to Cicero’s example when reading and writing, and in most of his 
writing he does. However, at key points of inflection within his De Officiis, Ambrose diverges 
from Cicero’s model. Given the literary cohesion expected of him because of his education, these 
points of departure speak louder to the reader than the many points where Ambrose conforms to 
Cicero.  
Like Cicero, Ambrose begins his discussion of duty with an exploration of the role of a 
father teaching his son. In his first sentence, he reveals his concerns about writing on such a 
sweeping philosophical subject: Non adrogens videri arbitror si inter filios suscipiam adfectum 
docendi, (“I believe that I do not seem arrogant if I will take up the task of teaching among my 
sons”).52 Ambrose’s foremost worry about his De Officiis is that he will seem arrogant, so he 
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leads with the assurance that he writes in good faith, as a father teaching his sons. While Cicero 
also begins by speaking about teaching sons, in contrast he leads with a proud recounting of the 
accomplishments of his son Marcus: Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum 
idque Athenis abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter summam et 
doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, (“Although it is fitting that you, Marcus my son, hearing now for 
a year from Cratippus of Athens, should overflow with the rules and institutes of philosophy, 
because of the highest authority of both the teacher and the city…”).53 Both authors foreground 
their filial audience, but where Cicero boasts about the quality of education his son is receiving, 
Ambrose frets about appearing arrogant.  
 In 1.24, Ambrose further justifies his purpose for writing over and against Cicero’s cause 
of writing. As mentioned above, he claims to write to his spiritual sons “just as Tullius did for 
the education of his son,” and continues: neque enim minus vos diligo quos in evangelio genui 
quam si coniugio suscepissem, (“And indeed, I do not love you all less, whom I have borne in 
the gospel, than if I had begotten you from a marriage”).54 Ambrose argues that his relationship 
to his gospel children is as legitimate as Cicero’s relationship to Marcus. He even goes a step 
further: Plus certe diligere debemus quos perpetuo nobiscum putamus futuros quam quos in hoc 
tantum saeculo, (“Certainly we ought to love those whom we think will be with us forever more 
than those in this age only”).55 Even as Ambrose models how he refers to his audience off of 
Cicero, he places his own work above that of his predecessor’s, on account of the superiority of 
his spiritual family to Cicero’s blood relatives. Ambrose chooses to follow in the literary 
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footsteps of Cicero as he shapes his new text but makes it clear that his way is superior to that of 
the pagan classical author.  
 When comparing the opening lines of both texts, the most immediate distinction between 
the two is in their sentence structure. Cicero’s first sentence is sixty-three words long and 
consists of nine dependent clauses. The famous orator acknowledges this complexity himself:  
Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi scientiam 
concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte, ornate dicere, quoniam in 
eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo 
vindicare,  
 
And indeed I do not wish for this thing to be considered arrogantly spoken. For, granting 
the knowledge of philosophy to many others, if I take for myself what is fitting for an 
orator, namely to speak appropriately, clearly, and elegantly (since I have used up my 
time in this pursuit), I seem to be justified by my right in some way.56 
 
Cicero claims to be the foremost possessor of the knowledge that is fitting for an orator. Like 
Ambrose, he expresses concern about being considered arrogant, but instead of claiming 
humility as Ambrose does, he justifies himself through an account of his skills. Cicero does not 
present a front of false modesty, and instead grounds his entire text in his ability to present 
information with rhetorical skill.  
In contrast, Ambrose writes with a simpler sentence structure. Most of his sentences are 
brief and clear, with a restrained number of clauses when compared to Cicero’s fondness of 
excess. Although this difference in syntax could simply reflect Ambrose’s lesser rhetorical skill 
when compared to the greatest Roman orator, Davidson argues that Ambrose intentionally 
chooses a simple writing style: “Rhetorical eloquence, in his view, is a distraction from the 
exposition of vital truth. The ‘right’ use of language is not simply a matter of clear 
communication: it is an ethical responsibility, part of the Christian’s overall obligation to act in a 
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way that will earn divine approval (cf. 1.8).”57 In Davidson’s view, the very ability that Cicero 
uses to support his treatise is what Ambrose fears will disqualify his work. However, this seems 
to overly simplify the complex relationship Ambrose must have to rhetoric as a member of both 
elite Roman and Christian communities. Ambrose handles his use of his education in paideia by 
putting it in the background and foregrounding a new kind of education. Instead of claiming 
some prior knowledge or skill that has prepared him to write De Officiis, Ambrose places himself 
among his students: et hanc ipsam ut docendi studio possim discere, (“and this very thing I 
desire, that in my zeal for teaching, I might be able to learn”).58 Cicero’s pedagogy stems from 
his prior learning, but Ambrose speaks of his teaching as a tool for his own learning.  
Despite his posturing as an unlearned man hoping to glean a little knowledge from the 
enim verus magister, or “one true master,” Ambrose was fully initiated into the culture of 
paideia and lived as a member of elite Roman society. Ambrose’s “mind is steeped in the 
language of the two giants of his school curriculum, Cicero and Vergil.”59 Although Ambrose 
seems distrustful of rhetoric, the inculcation of paideia in him from a young age means that his 
sense of Latin style and syntax bleeds out in his writing. Whether intends to or not, Ambrose 
writes as someone who has not only read, but closely studied, Cicero’s prose. Despite his claims 
of ignorance and lack of teaching qualification, Ambrose is highly educated by the standards of 
his contemporary Roman culture. As Davidson points out, even as Ambrose claims to write 
without the trappings of rhetoric, he produces several pithy and elegant “one-liners.”60 Even his 
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statement positioning himself as the ultimate student fits this description: ut docendi studio 
possim discere is to the point, yet packs a complex idea into five words.61 Pithy statements like 
this one are both elegant and accessible, which reflects the Christian’s unique concern for 
reaching a broad range of people with the message of the gospel. Kaster identifies “the need for 
compelling, authoritative, yet accessible speech, capable of opening up texts singularly important 
in their truth but often obscurely deep or seemingly ambiguous” as a concern at the front of the 
minds of early Christian authors.62 Short and straightforward sayings demystify the Christian life 
and make it accessible to a greater number of people. The one-liners that pepper Ambrose’s De 
Officiis, while rhetorically impactful, reflect a broader concern for his audience.  
In terms of structure, Ambrose’s introduction closely follows the convention of Cicero’s. 
Cicero chooses to begin with an apologetic for the value of an education in Greek and Latin 
literature and philosophy in 1.1. He follows this with a robust list of his best qualities which 
validate his writing in 1.2-1.4. In 1.5 and 1.6, he writes a justification for his choice of topic, 
officium, before launching into the meat of his argument, which he models off of Panaetius’ περὶ 
τοῦ καθήκοντος.63 By and large, Ambrose follows Cicero’s organizational system when he 
writes his own De Officiis. He writes about his role as a teacher in 1.1-1.4, and he provides his 
rationale for writing on officium in 1.23-25. In the middle of these two justifications of himself 
and his topic, Ambrose inserts a lengthy reflection on Psalm 38.64 At first glance, this seems out 
of place in a text modeled on Cicero, and some scholars have suggested that 1.5-22 originally 
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existed as an independent sermon which was inserted into the text at a later date.65 Although a 
multi-paragraph tangent reflecting on scripture is a far cry from Cicero’s three-paragraph 
indulgence in his own ego, Ambrose’s intentions with this passage come into focus when viewed 
in contrast with its parallel section in Cicero’s text.  
Psalm 38, Silence, and an Un-Ciceronian Perspective 
As Ambrose expands on the structure of Cicero’s introduction, he shifts the topic of his 
text to the value of silence, which seems particularly un-Ciceronian. Surely Cicero never 
hesitated to speak due to respect for silence or concern over his own fitness to do so. Because of 
his rigorous induction into the culture of paideia and his internalization of Cicero’s content, 
structure, and prose in the De Officiis, the points where Ambrose chooses to depart from his 
model are what strike the reader. Instead of diving into his philosophical treatise, which Cicero 
does at this point, Ambrose slows down and shows his readers what he values. By diverging 
from the expected structure of such a text as laid out by Cicero, Ambrose draws attention to his 
meditation on silence and highlights the ways that this theme signals his Christian identity and 
ethics. 
Ambrose begins his meditation on silence from a posture of rational questioning. After 
placing himself in the position of one who wishes to learn, Ambrose asks the next logical 
question: what is the most important thing to learn? A reader familiar with Cicero’s version of 
De Officiis would expect the answer to this question to be officium itself—this question seems to 
naturally lead into the topic of the philosophical treatise. Instead, Ambrose shifts gears: Quid 
autem prae ceteris debemus discere quam tacere, (“But what else ought we to learn before the 
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rest than to be silent?”).66 Just as his audience expects Ambrose to begin the philosophical work 
of his treatise, he brings up the importance of silence. Lest his readers think him hypocritical for 
spilling so much ink on the value of saying nothing, he qualifies this assertion: …tacere, ut 
possimus loqui, (“…to be silent, so that we are able to speak well”).67 Skill in speaking is 
Cicero’s defining characteristic, and Ambrose acknowledges its value while simultaneously 
dismissing the skill of anyone who speaks without properly valuing silence. Ambrose seems to 
recognize the irony of his own lengthy discussion of silence, continuing: …loqui, ne prius me 
vox condemnet mea quam absolvat aliena? Scriptum est enim: Ex verbis tuis condemnaberis. 
(“…to speak well, so that my voice might not condemn me sooner than another voice could 
absolve me. For it is written: ‘From your words you will be condemned’”).68 Ambrose references 
Matthew 12:37 to ground his writing in Biblical authority, but this reference serves a second 
purpose. By writing extensively about the merits of silence and learning to speak well, Ambrose 
escapes the very condemnation that such activities should engender. Ambrose’s argument in 
favor of silence works to justify his own breaking of the silence.  
Although Ambrose’s discussion of silence may seem tangential at first, he uses the 
culmination of 1.5-1.22 to set the tone for the rest of his work. Throughout the passage, Ambrose 
explores silence, speech, humility, and pride, providing examples and scripture references to 
support his argument in favor of humble silence. From 1.5-1.20, the only person Ambrose names 
is Susanna, who was silent when unjustly tried for adultery in the disputed thirteenth chapter of 
Daniel. He holds her up as an exemplar of productive silence: negotiosum silentium, ut erat 
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Susannae, (“hardworking silence, as Susanna’s was”).69 In 1.21, he presents his reader with a 
second case study, this time of David: Cur non imitamur dicentem: ‘Obmutui et humiliatus sum 
et silui a bonis?’ (“Why shouldn’t we imitate the one who says ‘I was speechless and I was 
abased and I was silent about my good works?’”).70 By calling his readers to imitate David’s 
posture of humble silence, Ambrose taps into Roman convention of exemplarity.71 Instead of 
appealing to examples of men like Pompey the Great or Scipio Africanus, like Cicero would, 
Ambrose turns to the Bible to provide men worthy of emulation. Ambrose conforms to the 
expectations of Roman paideia by writing about exempla, but he distinguishes himself from 
classical culture by relying on an ancient Hebrew king as the role model for his readers.  
To further put to rest any arguments that 1.5-1.22 were shoehorned into the text to fill out 
the introduction, Ambrose clarifies the purpose of this meditation. He writes, Neque improvide, 
ad vos filios meos scribens, huius psalmi prooemio usus sum, (“I did not use the preface of this 
Psalm recklessly while writing to you, my sons”).72 Ambrose anticipates confusion over his 
choice to diverge from the structure laid out by Cicero, and he reassures his readers that his 
choice was not improvide, or reckless. Although at first this lengthy tangent seems disconnected 
from the body of his text, for Ambrose the connection between the two is clear. He explains that 
Psalm 38 teaches about patience, silence, and the rejection of earthly wisdom, quae maxima 
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virtutum fundamenta sunt, (“which are the greatest foundations of virtues”).73 Rather than 
distracting from the ethical topics at hand, Ambrose’s meditation on the Psalm gets to the 
foundation of all virtue. For Ambrose, there can be no appropriate treatise on duties without a 
grounding in scripture. Where Cicero relies on the authority of his philosophical predecessors to 
ground his work, Ambrose appeals to ancient Hebrew scripture. By making the choice to diverge 
from the structure of Cicero’s introduction, Ambrose makes his scriptural meditation and 
inspiration stand out more than if he had conformed to the expected flow of such a text. 
In 1.25, when he finally turns to the same task that Cicero attended to in 1.5, Ambrose 
justifies officium as his choice of topic. He writes,  
Ergo quoniam personae conveniunt, videamus utrum res ipsa conveniat scribere de 
officiis et utrum hoc nomen philosophorum tantummodo scholae aptum sit an etiam in 
scripturis reperiatur divinis. 
 
Therefore, since the players have been assembled, let us see whether this thing is suitable, 
namely to write about duties, and whether this word is appropriate only for the schools of 
the philosophers, or if it is also discovered in the divine scriptures.74 
 
Ambrose’s reference to personae, a word with dramatic connotations that can even denote the 
masks which actors wore in classical theater, comes at the heels of his explanation in 1.24 that 
his spiritual children are even more fitting addressees than Cicero’s blood relative.75 By using 
personae in this context, Ambrose suggests that he is playing the role of Cicero, and his readers 
play the role of Marcus. Despite the fact that he goes on to ground his treatise in Biblical 
precedent, Ambrose preconditions the further development of his argument on the fulfilling of 
the roles set by Cicero in his treatise. In addition, the first part of Ambrose’s inquiry into the 
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suitability of his topic echoes Cicero’s claim to write quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum et 
auctoritati meae, (“that sort of thing which is most fitting both for your age and for my 
authority”).76 As he begins to treat officium, Ambrose follows Cicero’s precedent. 
Only in the latter half of his indirect question does Ambrose forge into new territory by 
asking whether officium lies wholly in the realm of the philosopher or if it is a topic warranted by 
scripture. Here, as with his conclusion to the lengthy reflection on Psalm 38, he concludes with a 
specific example from the Bible: the priest Zacharias is described as having officium in Luke 1.77 
Ambrose expresses concern about stepping outside of his prescribed role as a Christian and into 
the realm of the philosophers, despite the flexibility of boundaries between both social groups.  
In her exploration of social identity formation within Roman intellectual culture, Kendra 
Eshleman describes the dynamic at play here: “Yet despite—or because of—this patent fluidity, 
sophists, philosophers, and Christians all treat participation and social contact with other insiders 
as an index of insider status. Members of all three groups implicitly and explicitly portray 
themselves as defending their community’s borders.”78 Ambrose’s concern for the border 
between the community of the philosophers and that of the Church does not reflect a reality 
where the two are completely separated, but instead defends a performative boundary that is 
unclear and easily crossed. Ambrose lands on the right side of this symbolic boundary by 
appealing to Zacharias rather than past philosophical thinkers. In 1.25, Ambrose takes his reader 
through the same paces that he repeats in the rest of his text by starting in alignment with Cicero 
and ending with scriptural support for his argument.  
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Throughout the introduction to his De Officiis, Ambrose engages in a dance of cohesion 
and divergence with Cicero’s treatise of the same name. From the beginning, Ambrose makes it 
clear that his work is based on Cicero’s earlier version, and in many ways his text conforms to its 
predecessor. This consistency in structure and theme makes the points where Ambrose chooses 
to go his own way particularly meaningful. Ambrose’s meditation on Psalm 38 in 1.5-1.22 seems 
out of place and unnecessary at first glance, but upon closer consideration plays an important 
rhetorical role in the text. By introducing this reflection on scripture, Ambrose makes his 




Chapter Three: Ambrose’s Adaptation of Classical Philosophy 
 
 Throughout the introduction to his De Officiis, Ambrose sets up a contrast between 
himself and the philosophiae studentes, or devotees of philosophy.79 His meandering injections 
of Biblical anecdotes and concern about whether he is qualified to teach contribute a less 
philosophical tone to his work. As he sets up his text, Ambrose defends himself against his 
Roman predecessor, Cicero, and the orator’s predecessors, ancient Greek philosophers. Such 
intentional contrasts serve to obscure what Ambrose is doing through the De Officiis: as much as 
he protests that he is not one of the philosophers, he produces a three-volume text devoted to the 
study of ethics. Ambrose does the work of a philosopher. That Ambrose was intimately familiar 
with the fourth century canon of classical philosophy would be immediately apparent to a reader 
who, like Ambrose, had been inducted into paideia. Throughout the De Officiis, Ambrose signals 
his elite status and education by obliquely referencing classical philosophers and engaging in the 
tradition of Panaetius’ περὶ τοῦ καθἠκοντος, or “About Ethics.”80 However, Ambrose does not 
simply demonstrate his knowledge of existing ethical philosophy. Instead, he picks and chooses 
the ideas that fit with his Christian worldview and gives them Biblical origin stories while 
casting aside those that do not. As he adapts Cicero, Stoicism, and other Greek philosophers, 
Ambrose demonstrates his own induction into paideia while constructing a new and superior 
system of ethics. 
Ambrose’s Philosophical and Religious Tradition 
 As I argued in the previous chapter, Ambrose deliberately models his De Officiis on 
Cicero’s original version of the same name. The first chapter traced the literary ways that 
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Ambrose engages with Cicero, but the similarities between the two texts do not stop here. 
Ambrose goes so far as to ground his philosophy in Cicero’s text. His philosophical engagement 
with Cicero is most obvious when Ambrose explicitly references him in the midst of 
philosophical discourse. In 1.43, he says that Plato is considered the originator of the devil’s 
advocate role, and that Cicero implemented this concept in his De Re Publica.81 This reference, 
which is echoed in 1.180, shows that Ambrose was considering Cicero as a philosophical 
thinker, not simply as a skilled writer.  
In 1.82, Ambrose takes his use of Cicero the philosopher one step further. He states that 
everyone should act in appropriate ways and seek order in their lives, and then brings in Cicero 
to support his argument: Unde Tullius etiam ordinem putat in illo decore servari oportere idque 
positum dicit ‘in formositate ordine ornatu ad actionem apto’ […], (“From this Cicero also 
thinks that it is necessary that order be guarded in that honor, and he says that this thing is 
situated in ‘beauty, order, and decorations appropriate to action’”).82 Despite the fact that he 
immediately disputes Cicero’s evaluation of formositate, his inclusion of a Ciceronian quote 
reveals that Ambrose is engaging with the republican author on a philosophical level. 
Additionally, Ambrose takes up Cicero’s concerns with the good, honestum, and the expedient, 
utile, in ethical decision making and maintains his understanding of the four cardinal virtues of 
prudence, courage, justice, and temperance.83 In his explicit reference to Cicero as a philosopher 
and his modelling of philosophical content to his predecessor’s structure, Ambrose makes it clear 
that Cicero is his most immediate point of reference when writing his philosophical text. 
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 By framing his philosophical treatise around Cicero’s earlier version, Ambrose builds off 
of Cicero’s predecessors as well. Cicero models his work on that of Panaetius, a Greek stoic who 
wrote in the second century BCE. As much as Cicero became an integral part of the curriculum 
of paideia in the fourth century, Greek philosophy was central to the elite education that Cicero 
received in the first century BCE.84 In writing De Officiis, Cicero was one of the first Roman 
authors to attempt “to render conceptual ideas which had long been mediated in Greek into the 
less flexible structures of the Latin language.”85 Despite the long-held idea among scholars of 
Classics, which Gisela Striker identifies, that Cicero’s philosophy is derivative and uninspired 
when compared to its Greek counterparts, Cicero states in his De Officiis that he is writing in 
order to fill a gap in Panaetius’ previous work.86 He writes, Panaetius igitur, qui sine 
controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita 
potissimum secuti sumus, (“Therefore Panaetius, who without controversy investigated duty the 
most carefully, and whom we are following as much as possible, with some improvement having 
been applied”).87 Cicero claims to follow Panaetius’ model potissimum, yet simultaneously 
claims to have improved upon the Greek philosopher. The need for correctione to which Cicero 
refers is the opportunity for conflict between the good and the expedient in Panaetius’ system.88 
Cicero seeks to innovate upon the existing philosopher’s work by providing a solution to one of 
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its flaws. Thus, it seems that philosophical text on which Ambrose models his De Officiis owes 
its philosophy to Panaetius, an even earlier author. 
 Panaetius wrote his περὶ τοῦ καθἠκοντος within the tradition of Stoicism. Stoicism 
originated in Greece in the late fourth and third centuries BCE, but Panaetius and his peers wrote 
in the second century and are consequently referred to as the middle Stoa in scholarly 
discussion.89 John Sellars writes that the middle Stoa is characterized by “increasing 
eclecticism,” which is exemplified in Panaetius’ non-Stoic belief in the eternity of the world and 
the necessity of material belongings for happiness, combined with his traditional Stoic rejection 
of Plato’s concept of the immortal soul.90  In περὶ τοῦ καθἠκοντος, written around 139 BCE, 
Panaetius writes about how to make ethical choices. He divides right actions into the good, 
καλόν, and the expedient, συµφέρον. Panaetius does not address what the right course of action 
is when the good and expedient seem to conflict with each other, and Cicero sees the lack of 
such an explanation as a flaw in his predecessor’s work.91 Furthermore, Cicero’s four cardinal 
virtues, which Ambrose also adopts, are associated with Stoic thought.92 Although Panaetius’ 
περὶ τοῦ καθἠκοντος no longer survives, through the transmission of his Stoic ideas in Cicero’s, 
and later Ambrose’s, De Officiis, a modified system of Stoic ethics is accessible to the modern 
reader. 
 By modeling his own De Officiis on Cicero’s contribution to Stoic though, Ambrose 
engages with an ancient Greek school of philosophy. Because the dichotomy between 
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Christianity and “paganism” has been engrained in discussions about religious communities over 
the centuries, it seems unlikely to the casual reader that a Christian author would write a three-
volume work based on a pagan text. However, Christian authors had been working with and 
adapting classical philosophy from the start. E.P. Sanders highlights Paul’s praise of 
contentedness in Philippians 4:11-12 as consistent with the sentiment and tone of a Stoic 
author.93 Even though this similarity does not necessarily mean that Paul bought into the Stoic 
philosophical system, it does show that the schools of philosophy entrenched in his world 
influenced the way he wrote his letters.94 Because even the apostles lived in a non-Christian 
world, it is not surprising that Greek philosophy has touched Christian writing from its 
beginning. 
In the centuries between Paul and Ambrose, Jewish and Christian authors engaged in 
discourse with and about the classical philosophers. Philo of Alexandria, a first century Jew who 
became influential within early Christianity, has been pejoratively described as a “jackdaw” 
because of the ease with which he “steals” bits and pieces of other philosopher’s work.95 David 
Runia reframes this observation in positive terms: “It cannot be denied that when he is trying to 
explain the words of Mosaic scripture, Philo picks and chooses precisely those doctrines or 
insights from the fund of Greek philosophy which suit his exposition.”96 Philo participates in 
classical philosophy as far as it serves his purposes as a Biblical interpreter. In the second 
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century, Justin Martyr claimed that classical philosophers “spoke well in proportion to the share 
[they] had of the seminal Logos.”97 For Justin, any truth that can be found within the writings of 
Greek philosophers reflects a connection to the Logos, which the Gospel of John identifies with 
the person of Jesus.98 The third century writer Origen borrowed the Stoic concept of natural law 
in contrast to civic law to explain why Christians could reject the laws of Rome which 
commanded them to violate their consciences.99 Throughout the history of Christian thought, 
Christian authors, along with non-Christian authors who became subsumed into the Christian 
tradition, interpret and adapt classical philosophy to fit their own interpretations of the world. 
When Ambrose writes a treatise on ethics, he writes not only in the vein of Cicero and the 
middle Stoa, but also in that of previous Christian writers. As Marcia Colish notes, Ambrose’s 
primary method of interpreting classical philosophy falls neatly in line with the strategy used by 
his Christian predecessors: "Sometimes, in dealing with philosophical doctrines that he regards 
as compatible with Christianity, he adverts to a patristic and apologetic commonplace, derived in 
turn from Hellenistic Jewish apologetics, which claims that the Greek philosophers acquired 
their wisdom from the Old Testament.”100 While Colish’s dismissive characterization of 
Ambrose’s interaction with philosophy may be unnecessarily critical, her location of his method 
within a Christian interpretive tradition is helpful. In particular, she highlights the inclination of 
Ambrose, along with many Christian authors, to point to the Bible as the source of all true 
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philosophy. The construction of such narratives is the most blatant way that Ambrose engages 
with the classical philosophy he encounters in De Officiis. Additionally, he rejects the parts of 
Stoic philosophy that he finds inconsistent with his Christian worldview. As he both affirms and 
undermines different aspects of Greek philosophy, Ambrose demonstrates his internalized 
knowledge of classical philosophers and their ideas.  
Ambrose’s Adaptation: Close Readings 
 As Ambrose launches his philosophical inquiry in the first book of De Officiis, he 
provides a prime example of the retrojection of philosophical values into the Biblical narrative. 
As he justifies his choice of the topic of duty, Ambrose locates the source of this idea in the Old 
Testament:  
Numquid prior Panaetius, numquid Aristoteles, qui et ipse disputavit de officio, quam 
David, cum et ipse Pythagoras, qui legitur Socrate antiquior, prophetam secutus David 
legem silentii dederit suis?  
 
Was Panaetius, was Aristotle, who investigated duty, earlier than David, and was not 
Pythagoras himself, who is considered more ancient than Socrates, following the prophet 
David when he gave the law of silence to his own followers?101  
 
Throughout his text, Ambrose rarely refers to his classical predecessors by name, instead 
indicating them through vague third-person pronouns. In this passage, Ambrose breaks this norm 
and names not one but four famous Greek philosophers, each of whom belongs to a distinct 
philosophical tradition. By specifically naming these thinkers, Ambrose’s transposition of the 
origins of their ideas becomes more pointed. This allows him to claim whatever he wishes from 
any of the four traditions as a biblical truth. Ambrose argues that Pythagoras’ institution of 
silence among his disciples must be secutus, following in the footsteps of David, simply because 
the Jewish king lived before the archaic Greek philosopher. Ambrose appeals to the historicity of 
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the Bible as an apology for David as the original philosopher upon whom all others are 
modelled. 
 Not only does Ambrose locate the origin of classical philosophy in the ancient land of 
Israel, but he argues that David’s version of philosophy is superior to that of the Greek 
philosophers. He continues with the example of Pythagoras’ legem silentii, or law of silence:  
Sed ille ut per quinquennium discipulis usum inhiberet loquendi; David autem non ut 
naturae munus imminueret sed ut custodiam proferendi sermonis doceret,  
 
But he acted so that he might hold back the enjoyment of speaking from his disciples for 
five years; but David did not act so that might diminish the gift of nature, but so that he 
might teach the safe-guarding of the producing of speech.102  
 
Ambrose constructs a stark contrast between Pythagoras and David in this sentence through the 
words that he chooses to describe each man. Pythagoras is a kill-joy whose primary goal is usum 
inhiberet loquendi—to prevent the enjoyment of speaking. Ambrose furthers this 
characterization by emphasizing the five-year period of silence that Pythagoras prescribes. Not 
only does the Greek philosopher limit the lives of his disciples for limitation’s sake, but he does 
so for an arbitrarily long time. The Pythagorean life looks bleak in this passage. In contrast, 
David does not naturae munus imminueret, or lessen the gifts of nature, as Pythagoras does. 
Instead, the shepherd-king takes a more pastoral approach and focuses on teaching his people to 
take care of the natural gift of speech. Where Pythagoras is stern, David is gentle, and where 
Pythagoras’ purpose is opaque, David’s is both clear and admirable. Ambrose portrays 
Pythagorean silence as a poor copy of the Biblical original. 
 After he proves that David’s silence both precedes and supersedes Pythagoras’, Ambrose 
turns to an exploration of the two types of duty. One of Cicero’s innovations on Panaetius’ work 
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is his introduction of the category of media officia, or middle duties, which provide opportunities 
for everyday people to act honorably, instead of the Stoic idea that the good is an ideal 
unattainable by most.103 Ambrose takes up Cicero’s division of duty into the lofty perfect and the 
easier to reach middle. However, in keeping with the way that he treated Pythagoras in 1.31, he 
traces the origins of this concept back to the Bible: Officium autem omne aut medium aut 
perfectum est, quod aeque scripturarum auctoritate probare possumus. (“But all duty is either 
middle or perfect, which we are equally able to prove by means of the authority of Scripture”).104 
Even though Ambrose does not name Cicero or any other philosopher in this paragraph, his 
inclusion of aeque, equally, acknowledges that his reader is likely thinking of a non-Biblical 
proof for this concept. Even though an educated reader would be familiar with the division of 
duty from studying Cicero, Ambrose suggests that it is the scriptural proof that should be 
foremost in the Christian’s mind.  
 Once he establishes the scriptural basis for middle and perfect duty, Ambrose provides an 
example of perfect duty that brings together Christian and Stoic ideas to form a Christian ethical 
injunction.  He writes, Bona etiam misericordia, quae et ipsa perfectos facit, quia imitatur 
perfectum Patrem, (“Mercy is also good, which itself makes men perfect, because it imitates the 
perfect Father”).105 Even as he continues to use the Ciceronian language of middle and perfect 
duty, he points to God as the only source of perfection. He continues, drawing together the 
Christian conception of Misericordia, or mercy, and the Stoic belief in the commonality of 
humanity:  
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Nihil tam commendat Christianam animam quam misericordia, primum in pauperes, ut 
communes iudices partus naturae quae omnibus ad usum generat fructus terrarum,  
 
Nothing commends the Christian spirit more than mercy, first towards the impoverished, 
so that you may consider the yields of nature to be communal, that fruit of the earth 
which it begets for the enjoyment of all.106 
 
Ambrose carries mercy into this sentence, which on its own gives this statement a Christian 
flavor. Furthermore, his focus on the poor is a distinctly Christian concern. Peter Brown argues 
that care for the impoverished was a foreign concept in pre-Christian Rome: “To put it bluntly, it 
was Christian bishops who invented the poor. […] Step by step, they soaked significant areas of 
late antique society in the novel and distinctive dye of a notion of ‘love of the poor.’”107 By 
advocating for mercy primum in pauperes, Ambrose puts forward a Christian construction of 
right action.  
However, Ambrose also endorses a Stoic concept in the same breath. Immediately 
following his mention of the poor, Ambrose nearly quotes Cicero’s De Officiis 1.51: In qua 
omnium rerum quas ad commune hominum usum natura genuit est servanda communitas, (“In 
which the common holding of all things, which nature begets for the common enjoyment of men, 
must be kept safe”)108 Ambrose uses similar vocabulary in his own passage, repeating 
communes, naturae, omnibus, usum, and generat. In this passage Ambrose explicitly calls back 
to Cicero’s pre-Christian text while simultaneously describing an idealized version of Christian 
mercy. Furthermore, Davidson describes the concept that Ambrose references as the 
“fundamental Stoic doctrine that the earth’s produce is given for all in common.”109 As much as 
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Ambrose’s mention of the poor signals his Christianity, this reference to the commonality of 
earthly resources signals Stoic thought. By drawing attention to both his Christian faith and his 
Stoic influences, Ambrose creates a compound ethic of charity that incorporates the Christian 
concern for the poor and the Stoic understanding of all humanity’s common standing in the 
world. 
 As he continues exploring ethics in De Officiis, Ambrose goes so far as to retroject a 
fundamentally Greek philosophical method into the Old Testament. He interrupts his own 
discussion of the book of Job to bring up a classical philosopher by name: Laudatur in Platone 
quod in Politia sua posit eum… (“There is praise for Plato because he put this thing into his 
Republic…”).110 By placing laudatur in the passive voice, Ambrose avoids directly commending 
Plato himself and sets up his reader to expect a reversal in this initial premise. He goes on to say 
that this supposedly praiseworthy thing is Plato’s introduction of a devil’s advocate into his 
dialogue. This character’s purpose is veri inveniendi atque examinandae disputationis, (“the 
finding of the truth and the examining of the argument”).111 Such a figure is central to the 
dialogic form that defines Platonic philosophy. Ambrose acknowledges the influential nature of 
this construct, noting that Cicero employed it in his own rendition of the Republic.112 In this 
paragraph Ambrose draws attention to one of the most iconic features of Ancient Greek 
philosophy in order to make it Biblical in the following paragraph.  
 As he has now trained his reader to expect, Ambrose sets up Job as both the originator 
and the best implementer of the devil’s advocate character. He writes, Quanto antiquior illis Iob, 
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qui haec primus repperit nec eloquentiae phalerandae gratia sed veritatis probandae 
praemittenda aestimavit! (“How much older than them [Plato and Cicero] is Job, who discovered 
this thing first, and not for adorning eloquence but for demonstrating the truth did he value 
sending ahead excuses”).113 Ambrose returns to his favorite refrain: the men in the Bible predate 
the philosophers of Ancient Greece. Even as he applies this argument to rhetorical advice, he 
claims that Job’s use of dialogue stands above the shallow adornment of rhetoric. Phalerae was 
typically used to refer to jewelry for women or military decorations for men.114 Given the 
Christian suspicion of external appearances, as laid out in 1 Peter 3:3, Ambrose’s use of 
phalerandae takes on a negative connotation. He suggests that eloquence is as superficial as 
costume jewelry, despite the rhetorical nature of the device he claims for Job. In contrast, Job 
uses the devil’s advocate for the more serious and sober-minded task of veritatis probandae, 
proving what is true. Through this phrasing, Job takes up the mantle of a philosopher, more so 
than even Plato and Cicero. Ambrose claims that Job invents rhetoric without succumbing to its 
shallowness and inquires after truth with more commitment than any Greek philosopher. 
 Ambrose continues his interpretation and adaptation of classical philosophy in much the 
same way throughout his text. At some points, however, Ambrose discards his strategies of 
adaptation and outright rejects a concept, philosopher, or entire school of philosophy. In 1.29, he 
makes space for his new treatise on ethics by dismissing one of the core principles of all other 
texts: Non superfluum igitur scriptionis nostrae est opus, quia officium diversa aestimamus 
regula atque illi aestimaverunt. (“Therefore our work of writing is not unnecessary, because we 
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evaluate duty by different rules than those men [philosophers] evaluate it by”).115 Here Ambrose 
claims that his own understanding of ethics is vastly different from that of any classical 
philosopher, but he does not reject the other philosophers until he moves on to the next sentence:  
Illi saeculi commoda in bonis ducunt, nos haec etiam in detrimentis, quoniam qui hic 
recepit bona, ut ille dives, illic cruciatur, et Lazarus, qui mala hic pertulit, illic 
consolationem invenit. 
 
 They consider the advantages in this age to be in good things, but we consider them to be 
in the harmful, since he who receives good things in this one, as that rich man, are 
tormented in the next one, and Lazarus, who endured bad things in this age, found 
comfort in the next.116  
 
This sentence raises the stakes on Ambrose’s claims: not only are the classical philosophers 
diversa from Christian thought, but their views can lead to torment in the next life. Ambrose 
writes to provide a better, and even a regenerative, way to understand ethics. 
 Later in Book I, Ambrose turns his critical eye to a different group of philosophers: the 
Epicureans. As he considers the plight of the sinner who indulges in fleshly desires, Ambrose 
self-consciously pivots his discussion to rebut Epicureanism: Sed revertamur ad propositum, ne 
divisionem factam praeterisse videamur… (“But let us turn back to the plan, so that we might not 
seem to pass over the pre-determined sections…”).117 The word praeterisse calls to mind the 
praeteritio, a rhetorical device that Cicero employs frequently, which gives this sentence a sense 
that Ambrose is poking fun at his literary and philosophical model.118 Despite his voiced concern 
with deviating from the structure of his argument, Ambrose continues on with his digression: 
videntes sceleratos quosque divites laetos honoratos potentes, cum plerique iustorum egeant 
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atque infirmi sint, putant vel Deum nihil de nobis curare, ut Epicurei dicunt. (“[Some people], 
seeing those who are criminals partaking in wealth and happiness and honor, while many of the 
just are lacking and weak, think that God does not care about us at all, as the Epicureans say”).119 
While this statement is not in itself a condemnation, in the next phrase he describes people who 
think that God does not know what people do as flagitiosi, or “disgraceful.” Ambrose makes it 
clear that any philosophy that claims that God is not knowledgeable of and involved in his 
creation is incompatible with Christianity. Rather than seeking out a way to adapt Epicureanism 
to his own worldview, Ambrose does not hesitate to condemn this system of philosophy. 
 An undercurrent of paideia runs through all of Ambrose’s interactions with classical 
philosophy. Only an education in paideia could have prepared Ambrose to reference what the 
Pythagoreans, Epicureans, Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics think on a variety of ethical 
issues. Additionally, Ambrose’s explicit and implicit philosophical references require a reader 
who shares in his elite classical education. Despite the implications of the title used by the 
Maurist editors in the 17th century, De Officiis Ministrorum, Ambrose does not seem to write 
exclusively for the benefit of Roman clergy.120 Even if Ambrose’s audience is broader than a 
select number of churchmen, the philosophical themes of his text and the references to classical 
philosophy would hinder any readers who had not benefited from an education in paideia. While 
the primary purpose of his engagement with classical philosophy seems to be the construction of 
his hybrid form of Christian ethics, every instance in the text serves the secondary purpose of 
signaling Ambrose’s education and social status to his readers. 
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 Throughout his De Officiis, Ambrose picks and chooses from the fourth century canon of 
classical philosophy. If he comes across a concept that he agrees with, his primary strategy is to 
identify the same concept within the Bible. Even with ideas that he finds amenable, he frequently 
argues that the Bible is the source of the best possible version of the idea in question, which 
makes the classical version a lesser derivative of the original. Some ideas he finds completely 
incompatible with Christianity, in which case he sets up a contrast between the Christian 
interpretation, which leads to life, and the Greek philosophical position, which leads to death. In 
every case, Ambrose performs the identity of a man who has been inducted into paideia. Even 
though he never explicitly references his own education or social status, his project reveals these 
aspects of his identity.  
Ambrose’s Ambiguous Intentions 
 When scholars study Ambrose’s engagement with classical philosophy in De Officiis, 
they tend to ask to what end Ambrose was writing. Because of the multivalent way that he 
discusses earlier philosophers, his motivation is not immediately clear. Davidson lists some 
possible interpretations:  
The treatise has variously been taken as proof that Ambrose was a fraudulent plagiarist, a 
creative genius, and unreconstructed Roman chauvinist, a proto-Marxist, a Stoic 
masquerading as a Christian, a cultural anthropologist, a philosophical bridge-builder, a 
detester of all philosophy, and, last but not least, a spiritual giant whose gracious humility 
and self-effacement render his achievement in ennobling pagan virtue all the more 
remarkable.121 
 
Each of these pithy descriptions of Ambrose seem to reveal more about the scholars making 
these cases than about the motivations of the fourth-century Milanese bishop. Several of these 
categories, like “plagiarist” and “Marxist,” are anachronistic to late antique Rome, and others 
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assume that it is possible to condense Ambrose’s three-volume text down to one clear mission. 
Because Ambrose does not explicitly state his purpose, the only way to evaluate his work is in 
terms of what he produced. Here the scholarship divides into three camps: either Ambrose 
Christianized Stoicism, Stoicized Christianity, or constructed a new ethical system altogether.122  
 The theory that Ambrose created a Christianized form of Stoicism is the most popular in 
the scholarship. This makes sense, given the overt ways that Ambrose imposes Biblical 
narratives onto Stoic thought. Among the proponents of this theory is James Gaffney, who 
claims, “Stoic thought, especially in ethics, was not so much annihilated as assimilated by 
Christianity.”123 Within this category of scholarship, the understanding is that Ambrose 
transforms Stoicism to make it palatable to Christianity, while still maintaining the essence of the 
Greek philosophy. The opposite theory, that Ambrose changed Christianity into a form of 
Stoicism, was most popular at the beginning of the twentieth century. The claims made about 
orthodoxy by scholars like M.B. Emeneau do not fit well with current scholarly trends: 
“Ambrose may be considered the last of the Roman Christians, the last of those who, nurtured on 
pagan ideals, could not be possessed of true Christianity.”124 The argument that participation in 
Roman culture prevents “true” participation in Christianity goes against the premise of this 
thesis, as well as that of modern religious and classical scholarship. Christians were Romans and 
Romans were Christians in the fullest sense from the beginning of Christianity, so the suggestion 
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that Ambrose was a Christian in name only and Stoic in practice ignores the complex ways that 
religious and philosophical identities can intersect.  
Davidson takes the third stance, that Ambrose constructs a new system to replace the 
Ciceronian one.125 This position gives Ambrose the most creative potential. Rather than reading 
his De Officiis as a make-over of existing material, this perspective leaves room for Ambrose to 
exercise authorial power over his own text. Out of all three theories, the argument that Ambrose 
is creating something new in the De Officiis safeguards against a one-dimensional reading of this 
dynamic text’s interaction with classical philosophy.  
Philosophical Engagement as Identity Formation 
If Ambrose’s interactions with classical philosophy were limited to unilateral 
condemnation or acceptance through association with scripture, the question of Ambrose’s 
purpose and result would be simple enough to answer. What complicates his engagement with 
past thinkers is his induction into the culture of paideia. Elite Roman manhood was a distinctive 
identity, and through his specific references to philosophers, Ambrose repeatedly signals to his 
readers that he participates in this identity. In fourth century Rome, paideia was a source of both 
political and social capital, and as such it opened doors for those who had been inducted into it.  
Ambrose partakes in a second distinctive social identity: Christian-ness. Like an elite 
educational background, Christian identity opened the door to participation in a community, and 
like paideia, Christianity in the fourth century carried with it the potential for political and social 
power. What differentiates Christianity from paideia or Stoicism is the exclusivity it demands 
from its members. Even though, in reality, Christianity has always overlapped with other social 
and cultural identities, the New Testament warnings about not serving two masters and that there 
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is no other way to reach God than through Christ set up an unease for Christians about the way 
they interact with everything outside the Church.126 Ambrose participates in paideia and in 
Christianity, but the Christian claim of exclusivity troubles his relationship with “pagan” culture.  
Perhaps then Ambrose has no single intention in writing his De Officiis. Instead, I 
propose reading Ambrose’s ethical treatise as a working out of the bishop’s continuous 
navigation between his Christian and elite Roman identities. Because Christianity and paideia 
intersect in countless ways, the boundaries between the two are blurred, despite the increasing 
Christian impulse in the fourth century to define the edges of the religion. Within this 
framework, Ambrose’s eclecticism feels natural because it reflects his project of defining the 
boundaries, as well as points of connection, between his two identities. 
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Chapter Four: Ambrose’s Populist Self-Presentation  
 
 Up until this point, the primary concern of this thesis has been the way that Ambrose 
presents classical authors, whether his immediate intellectual predecessor Cicero or the more 
distant figures of the classical philosophical tradition. He explicitly shows his readers what he 
thinks about these authors and their opinions on a multitude of ethical questions. Even though 
Ambrose’s interactions with the figureheads of classical intellectual culture are multivalent and 
nuanced, that he is presenting them in a particular way to his audience is immediately clear. 
Underneath this more obvious project lies Ambrose’s subtler secondary motive: the construction 
of his own self-presentation. As a prominent public figure, within both the Christian and pagan 
communities in Milan, everything that Ambrose writes contributes to his reputation. Throughout 
the first book of the De Officiis, Ambrose constructs a multi-faceted image of himself as both an 
elite Roman citizen and an egalitarian Christian with no concern for worldly status. As he 
negotiates the balance between a populist affirmation of the masses and the specialized training 
he provides for clergy, Ambrose signals his powerful identity while denouncing elitism. 
 Ambrose’s Position in Milanese Society 
 In both civic and ecclesiastical contexts, Ambrose lived much of his life in the public eye. 
Paulinus, in his biography written around 412, describes Ambrose’s birth in terms of his father’s 
position at the time: Igitur posito in administratione praefecturae Galliarum patre eius Ambrosio 
natus est Ambrosius. (“Therefore, when his father Ambrose was put in charge of the 
administration of the prefecture of Gaul, Ambrose was born”).127 Ambrose shares his father’s 
name, and from the beginning of Paulinus’ account, his life is linked with his father’s 
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participation in public office. In Paulinus’ retelling of Ambrose’s life, the eventual bishop was 
primed to wield social power practically from birth:  
Cum videret sacerdotibus a domestica, sorore, vel matre manus osculari, ipse ludens 
offerebat dexteram dicens et sibi id ab ea fieri oportere, siquidem episcopum se futurum 
esse memorabat.  
 
When he saw that the hands of priests were kissed by a housemaid or his sister or mother, 
playing, he offered his right hand, saying that this thing was appropriate to be done to 
him by her, since he said that he would be a bishop.128  
 
Whether or not this anecdote reflects “the Holy Spirit who was nurturing him for bishophood” as 
Paulinus claims, its inclusion in a near-contemporary retelling of Ambrose’s life reveals a sense 
of importance and entitlement to positions of power.129 Even if the whole story is apocryphal, the 
existence of such a story demonstrates that Ambrose had a reputation for casually assuming roles 
of authority. 
 Ambrose quickly climbed the ranks of the Roman political system. Paulinus emphasizes 
paideia as the prerequisite to Ambrose’s civic success:  
Sed postquam edoctus liberalibus disciplinis ex urbe egressus est professusque in 
auditorio praefecturae praetorii, ita splendide causas perorabat ut eligeretur a viro 
illustri Probo, tunc praefecto praetorii, ad consilium tribuendum. Post quod 
consularitatis suscepit insignia ut regeret Liguriam Aemiliamque provincias, venitque 
Mediolanum. 
 
But after having been thoroughly instructed in the liberal arts, he departed from the city 
and began a career in the court of the Praetorian Prefect, and so splendidly pleaded his 
causes that he was plucked out by the honorable man Probus, who was then the 
Praetorian Prefect, to give advice. After this he received the honor of the consulship so 
that he might rule the provinces of Liguria and Aemilia, and he came to Milan.130  
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Despite Paulinus’ presentation of Ambrose’s youth as lived in the public eye and with a 
conscious desire to gain power in the future, the future bishop cannot begin his career in earnest 
until he has completed his education in the liberal arts. It is precisely his skill in the rhetorical 
arts of this education that allow him to advance to the role of adviser to the prefect, and 
ultimately to that of governor in 374. By his mid-30s Ambrose had achieved great political 
success.  
 Ambrose’s ordination to the bishopric of Milan came about while he was performing his 
public role as governor. Soon after his appointment as governor, Ambrose needed to subdue a 
brewing revolt among the Milanese Christian community.131 The local church was lacking a 
bishop, and when Ambrose went to the church Paulinus claims that he was met with cries of 
“Ambrose bishop” from the congregation.132 At this point Ambrose was only a catechumen and 
not yet a full member of the Church.133 Paulinus spends no time describing Ambrose’s earlier 
experiences with the Christian community; there is nothing on his resume that directly qualifies 
him for this position of spiritual leadership. Rather, it is his public Roman civic office that puts 
Ambrose in a position to become bishop.  
 Once Ambrose became bishop of Milan, he continued to wield significant power. The 
legitimization of Christianity in 313 allowed officers of the Church to begin to accrue influence 
beyond their own congregations. As Rita Lizzi Testa argues, “This complex process [of 
consolidating ecclesiastical power] was gradual and reached different stages in different regions 
of the empire. […] The foundation of such power, however, was already implicit in the status 
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that Constantine had granted to the officiants of the Christian cult at the same moment in which 
Christianity was recognized as the lawful religion of the empire.”134 By the time Ambrose was 
ordained, the power of the bishopric had grown for the past sixty years. In the late fourth century, 
bishops “became the center of the late antique city,” so Ambrose’s transition from imperial to 
ecclesiastical leadership did not require him to step out of public life or lay down a significant 
amount of political power.135 
 Although Paulinus’ account of Ambrose’s life may exaggerate or dramatize events for the 
sake of its hagiographical aim, the episodes that he chooses to include reveal information about 
Ambrose’s reputation in Milan. From this account, it is reasonable to conclude that Ambrose 
possessed considerable social power as a public figure. His education alone places him among 
the Roman elites, and his family history of political involvement further establishes him as a 
civically engaged citizen. His civic influence bleeds over into his religious life, which leads to 
his appointment as bishop immediately following his confirmation in the Church. Paulinus’ 
hagiography of Ambrose reveals the importance of reputation and social status in the bishop’s 
political and religious careers.  
 Given the public nature of Ambrose’s image, it is unsurprising that his self-representation 
in the De Officiis is carefully crafted. From his youth, Ambrose lived as a prominent member of 
Roman society, and part of his status involved his induction into paideia. By design, an elite 
Roman education taught young men to be strategic and restrained in their presentations of 
themselves, both verbally and physically, as the latter portions of this chapter will expand upon. 
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As he writes the De Officiis, which details appropriate beliefs and actions for Christians, 
Ambrose does not forget that he is the public face of the church in Milan. Instead, he projects a 
proto-populist image of himself and the Christian faith that he represents, while simultaneously 
upholding the value of paideia and signaling his own elite status. 
“Christian Populism” and Reinterpreting Peter Brown 
 Ambrose lived and wrote within a society with enormous gaps in power between the elite 
and common people. Because of his inborn status and his successful navigation of the political 
system of the Roman Empire in the late fourth century, Ambrose wielded significant social 
capital. Despite his own elevated position in society, he demonstrates a sensitivity towards the 
non-elite, and particularly the impoverished, throughout his De Officiis. In Power and 
Persuasion, Peter Brown identifies the tension between the elite world of influential Christian 
authors and the broad audience they aimed to reach. He writes, “We are dealing with what might 
be called a Christian populism, that flouted the culture of the governing classes and claimed to 
have brought, instead, simple words, endowed with divine authority, to the masses of the 
empire.”136 As the title suggests, Brown’s focus within Power and Persuasion is to explore 
Christian interactions with the power dynamics of fourth-century Rome. Although this emphasis 
at times leads to a more cynical reading of the motives of Church fathers than is necessarily 
warranted in their texts, Brown helpfully identifies the umbrella phenomenon of “Christian 
populism” and the effects that fall underneath it.  
 In this chapter, I will borrow Brown’s “Christian populism” as a shorthand term for a 
network of interconnected ideas. Despite the anachronism of applying “populism,” a modern 
political term, to late antique Rome, I find it useful as a way of identifying the posture towards 
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common people that Ambrose and other elite authors take.137 When I use “populism” in this 
chapter, I seek to convey a certain generosity of attitude towards “the masses,” as Brown 
highlights, as well as a sense of intentional outward messaging within this attitude. While the 
populist concerns that Ambrose expresses may very well be genuine, he is simultaneously 
crafting his own image as a bishop who cares for the poor. I choose to take up Brown’s 
“Christian populism” because it captures the political nature and humanitarian attitude of the 
writings of early Christian authors. 
 Within the valence of “Christian populism” lie several complimentary motifs of 
Ambrose’s De Officiis. He emphasizes the virtue of humility, which is not one of the cardinal 
Stoic virtues included in his philosophical models. Ambrose claims to write with simple 
language that is more accessible to a broader audience than Cicero’s text. He inverts typical 
attitudes about wealth and poverty, claiming that wealth is a spiritual hindrance and poverty is a 
spiritual blessing. While disavowing his own earthly advantages, Ambrose uplifts the appropriate 
etiquette and comportment learned through an education in paideia as signs of virtuous modesty. 
He portrays the Church as an egalitarian space where all are welcome but suggests that clergy 
should be held to a higher standard of education, and by extension, social class. All of these 
patterns within Ambrose’s text fall under the umbrella of “Christian populism” as I have defined 
it. Throughout his De Officiis, Ambrose constructs a multivalent image of his elite interactions 
with the common people of the Roman Empire.  
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Appeals to the People in the De Officiis 
 From the opening line of the text, Ambrose expresses his concern with the possibility of 
appearing prideful: Non adrogans videri arbitror, (“I trust that I will not seem arrogant…”).138 
Throughout his introduction he continues to discuss his humble position within the church. In 
1.3, Ambrose casts his purpose in writing in lowly terms:  
Non igitur mihi apostolorum gloriam vindico (quis enim hoc nisi quos ipse Filius elegit 
Dei?) non prophetarum gratiam, non virtutem evangelistarum, non pastorum 
circumspectionem, sed tantummodo intentionem et diligentiam circa scripturas divinas 
opto adsequi quam ultimam posuit apostolus inter officia sanctorum. 
 
Therefore I do not claim for myself the glory of the apostles (indeed who does, except 
those whom the Son of God chose himself?), nor the grace of the prophets, nor the valor 
of the evangelists, nor the foresight of the pastors, but I wish to attain such great effort 
and care around the divine scriptures as the apostle placed last among the duties of the 
saints.139  
 
Even as he ambitiously sets out to rewrite a well-known treatise on duty, Ambrose claims to 
strive after the bare minimum duty of a Christian. He uses vindico, a legal term, to strengthen his 
point that he does not deserve any share in the glory, grace, valor, or foresight of his spiritual 
superiors. In this passage, Ambrose humbly portrays himself as the lowest member of his 
religious community. Despite his protestations, Ambrose’s readers cannot separate this lowly 
version of himself from his public image as Bishop of Milan. He can continuously claim to 
perform only the most basic religious duties, but it is difficult to take him seriously given the 
high status of his position. 
 Ambrose goes on to use his political success as further justification for his humility as a 
Christian leader. After explaining that most teachers must learn their material before they teach it 
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to others, he complains that he did not have this same luxury: Ego enim raptus de tribunalibus 
atque administrationis infulis ad sacerdotium, docere vos coepi quod ipse non didici. (“Indeed, 
having been snatched away from the tribunals and the administrative insignias to the priesthood, 
I began to teach you all that which I had not learned”).140 This passage highlights the dual-
message of Ambrose’s expression of Christian populism. On the surface, he is further 
humiliating himself by confessing his insecurities about teaching within the Church. He paints 
his time spent in public office as futile and ill-equipped for his eventual role as bishop.  
At the same time, his choice to mention his success in a previous life signals Ambrose’s 
extensive social and political power. Brown describes such accounts of giving up secular 
success: “[Men such as Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine’s] very insistence on the extent to 
which their own conversion and subsequent duties in the Christian church had led them to 
sacrifice the advantages attached to wealth and refined diction drew attention to just those 
qualities.”141 Although Ambrose describes his previous success as a hindrance to his current role, 
his use of the violent raptus to capture his transition into the life of the church reminds his reader 
that he has made political sacrifices to become a bishop. Brown takes up Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
wording in his history of working class people in 20th century India: “To talk of sacrifice was 
then to talk of possessions, and hence of power.”142 Ambrose could have written this introduction 
without mentioning his former positions by name, but instead he chooses to draw attention to his 
social status and political success. In particular, administrationis infulis describes the ornamental 
symbols of those who work within the administration of the Empire. Ambrose wants his readers 
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to visualize the symbols of his political power even as he disavows the advantages of his former 
life.  
Ambrose’s discussion of giving up political success is further complicated by the power 
inherent to his new role as bishop. While he has certainly given up the outward adornments of 
his political office, Ambrose has exchanged them for the spiritual and political authority of the 
bishopric. Ambrose is fully aware of the power of church office, and elsewhere describes the 
Church as a “horse’s bit…to restrain the insolence of emperors, to curb the unrestrained boldness 
of tyrants.”143 Even though Ambrose makes much of sacrificing his political office in exchange 
for the humble position of teacher, his sacrifice is primarily a symbolic one. 
Another way that Ambrose conveys a sense of Christian populism is through his use of 
simple language throughout his treatise. In 1.29, Ambrose suggests that his De Officiis will be 
accessible to more people than the works of earlier philosophers. Deinde qui illa non legunt, 
nostra legent si volent, qui non sermonum supellectilem neque artem dicendi sed simplicem 
rerum exquirunt gratiam. (“Then those who do not read those things may read ours if they wish, 
those who do not seek ornamentation or skill of speaking, but rather the simple grace of 
things”).144 Ambrose is concerned with reaching a broader audience than his predecessors did, 
and he seeks to do so by writing in a simpler way. This sentiment falls within the valence of 
Christian populism because it seems to extend an invitation to the less educated to participate in 
philosophical discourse. Rather than reserving his ethical treatise for the intellectual elite of the 
Roman Empire, Ambrose claims to open up his text to a broader range of people. 
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In order to clear the way for the less educated to read his texts, Ambrose must set himself 
up as the metaphorical gatekeeper. While he says that he writes without any particular skill, he 
reminds his reader that he has been methodically trained in both the Greek and Roman 
philosophers who have already written about ethics. Ambrose’s induction into paideia empowers 
him to choose simplicity in his writing style. Furthermore, his goal of wider access to his ethical 
treatise was likely never actualized, as Averil Cameron writes: “[The Christian] attachment to 
written texts was remarkable in itself, even if it did not penetrate far down the social scale; there 
was little or nothing in Roman culture as a whole to induce such a development, and many 
features in this highly traditional society worked against it.”145 While Cicero’s complicated prose 
likely did not entice readers from outside of the culture of paideia, the solution to his narrow 
readership does not primarily lie in simplifying the language of the text. When Ambrose 
expresses a desire to reach “those who do not read those things” in 1.29, he presents himself as 
an author for the masses, despite the widespread illiteracy among the non-elite members of 
fourth-century Roman society.146 
 Literacy in fourth-century Rome is inherently connected to economic status, which is 
another topic that Ambrose expresses interest in. As he seeks to set himself apart from his 
philosophical forebears, he describes the inverted economics of Christianity:  
Neque aliqua commoda in facultatibus et copiis opum constituimus, sed incommoda haec 
putamus si non reiciantur: eaque oneri, cum adsunt, aestimari magis quam dispendio, 
cum erogantur.  
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And we do not consider there to be any advantages in opportunities and abundance of 
wealth, but rather we think these things to be disadvantages if they are not thrown off: 
they are considered more to be a burden when they are present than a loss when they are 
given away.147 
 
With this evaluation of material wealth, Ambrose gives value to the lives of the poor. Within the 
ethical system he puts forward, the poor are not doomed to a lesser existence than the rich—just 
the opposite. The poor do not carry the onus, or burden, of wealth, which suggests that their 
poverty is in fact a kind of freedom. In Ambrose’s system, it is dignified to live without material 
wealth. However, his assertion that the burden of wealth is greater than the loss of not having 
any comes across as tone deaf. To be in a position to “throw off” wealth is to have tremendous 
privilege; a Milanese Christian who had never been financially stable is unlikely to view material 
resources so casually. Even as Ambrose ennobles the poor, he describes their situation as 
spiritually beneficial without acknowledging the hardships that poverty entails. 
 A few paragraphs later, Ambrose deals more truthfully with the realities of poverty while 
still presenting himself in favor of the common people. He gives an ethical suggestion to those 
who have expendable resources: Tu nummum largiris, ille vitam accipit; tu pecuniam das, ille 
substantiam suam aestimat. Tuus denarius census illius est. (“You lavishly bestow a coin, he [the 
poor man] receives life; you give money, he considers it his very existence. Your pocket change 
is his wealth”).148 By acknowledging the real discrepancies between the rich and poor in the 
Roman Empire, Ambrose approaches an understanding of wealth and poverty that aligns more 
closely with the interests of Christian populism. Rather than glossing over economic lack as a 
spiritual benefit, as he did in 1.28, in this passage Ambrose reminds his reader that the wealthy 
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man’s excess resources could sustain the life of the poor man. This passage further humanizes 
the poor by acknowledging the real suffering that accompanies poverty.  
Ambrose takes his positive view of the poor one step further and identifies poverty as an 
outward symbol of interior morality. While he describes wealth as unbeneficial and a lack of 
material possessions as helpful in 1.28, in 1.44 he connects economic status with the state of the 
soul:  
Moritus innocens in potestate simplicitatis suae, in abundantia propriae voluntatis, sicut 
adipe repletam animam gerens. At vero peccator, quamvis foris abundet et deliciis 
diffluat, odoribus fragret, in amaritudine animae suae vitam exigit et ultimum diem 
claudit, nihil eorum quae epulatus fuerit referens boni, nihil secum auferens nisi pretia 
scelerum suorum. 
 
The innocent person dies in his own power of honesty, in the fullness of his personal will, 
bearing a spirit that is sated as with fat. But indeed the sinner, although he may abound 
with wealth in the forum, abandon himself to luxuries and smell of perfumes, ends his 
life and closes his last day in the bitterness of his own spirit, taking away nothing good 
from these things which he had feasted upon, bringing nothing with him except the costs 
of his own crimes.149 
 
In this passage, Ambrose equates innocence with lack and sin with abundance. The innocent 
person’s primary hope for comfort and satisfaction is in the spiritual reward of death, and the 
sinner enjoys material wealth but suffers after death. This passage, while giving the poor the 
moral high ground, swings back into the dehumanizing tone of 1.28. If poverty is the burden of 
the innocent, why should the poor complain of their poverty? Rather than acknowledging the 
difficulty of living without sufficient resources, this passage turns poverty into a positive feature 
of the individual’s life.  
The passages regarding wealth and poverty in Ambrose’s De Officiis suggest that the 
bishop genuinely cares for the poor and seeks to improve their reputations by casting them in a 
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positive moral light. Despite this sincere goal, Ambrose does not always strike a tone that 
recognizes the suffering involved in a life of poverty. Ambrose’s expression of Christian 
populism in these passages rings true at times and hollow at others. While Peter Brown might 
argue that this reflects Ambrose’s drive to gain personal power and persuade his audience of his 
beneficence, I suggest that the inconsistency in Ambrose’s treatment of the poor in the De 
Officiis reveals his struggle to articulate a Christian system of ethics while also sympathizing 
with the poor despite his own elite status.  
Polishing the Priesthood: Clergy Selectivity 
In the same text that Ambrose professes to value humility, simplicity, and even poverty, 
he provides guidelines of behavior for clergy that are influenced by his elite training in paideia. 
Ambrose never explicitly states that he holds church officers to the standards of the Roman elite, 
but instead uses ethical terminology to put these standards in a Christian context. Ambrose’s 
desire to raise up well-mannered and well-spoken clergy complicates the populist attitudes he 
espouses elsewhere in the De Officiis.  
Ambrose broaches the topic of personal comportment after extolling the virtue of 
modesty in 1.65 and following. In his characteristic way, he grounds his discussion in a biblical 
anecdote by citing the modesty of Isaac, Joseph, Moses, and Jeremiah.150 He continues in a 
theoretical discussion of the value of modesty for several paragraphs before providing his readers 
with a practical application for this virtue. He asks his readers to recall a mutual acquaintance: 
Meministis, filii, quemdam amicum, cum sedulis se videretur commendare officiis, hoc solo 
tamen in clerum a me non receptum, quod gestus eius plurimum dedeceret; (“You remembered, 
my sons, a certain friend, when he seemed to commend himself with his diligent carrying out of 
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duties, nevertheless was not received by me into the clergy for this reason alone, that his carriage 
of himself was very unbecoming”).151 Suddenly Ambrose’s discussion of modesty takes on a 
more serious tone. His ethical musings quickly shift as he tells his readers that dedecus, or 
unbecoming, actions can counteract the diligent carrying out of duty. A candidate for church 
office can do everything right but still be deemed ineligible is he does not control himself well in 
public. 
Ambrose continues, growing harsher in his critique of clergy who act without appropriate 
decorum: Alterum quoque, cum in clero repperissem, iubere me ne umquam praeiret mihi, quia 
velut quodam insolentis incessus verbere oculos feriret meos. (“There was another man also, in 
the clergy when I had encountered him, that I ordered to never go in front of me, because the gait 
of that immodest man scourged my eyes just as with a whip”)152 By framing the posture of this 
man in violent terminology, Ambrose makes it clear that he views physical comportment as a 
matter of morality. An ill-mannered way of carrying oneself is not just unpleasant, but even 
scarring to Ambrose. How can a man serve the church when his walk does violence to those who 
observe him? 
 For Ambrose, the link between outward comportment and spiritual qualification is clear. 
He explains that he was right to remove both of these men from ministry:  
Hoc solum excepi, nec fefellit sententia: uterque enim ab ecclesia recessit, ut qualis 
incessu prodebatur, talis perfidia animi demonstraretur. […] Lucebat in illorum incessu 
imago levitatis, species quaedam scurrarum precursantium.  
 
For this alone I removed them, and my judgment did not fail: indeed each of them 
withdrew from the church, with the result that as much was revealed in their walk as was 
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shown in their treachery of spirit. […] The image of inconstancy shone forth in the gait of 
those men, that same appearance of wandering buffoons.153 
 
In both of these cases, Ambrose based his decision to remove these men from their leadership 
position exclusively on the unbecoming nature of their actions, and he justifies this rationale by 
pointing to the eventual abandonment of orthodox Christianity by both men. He describes both 
men as levitatis, or inconstant, and claims that this internal flaw was manifest in their external 
presentations of themselves. Ambrose wholeheartedly claims that unseemly personal 
comportment should disqualify otherwise suitable men from church office. 
 If proper etiquette and comportment are necessary qualifications for clergy, how should 
candidates for office acquire these skills? Ambrose suggests that people can arrive at modesty by 
following the lead of nature:  
Nonne igitur ipsa natura est magistra verecundiae? Cuius exemplo modestia hominum, 
quam a modo scientiae quid deceret appellatam arbitror, id quod in hac nostri corporis 
fabrica abditum repperit, operuit et texit. 
 
Is not nature itself, therefore, the teacher of modesty? By whose example the moderation 
of men, which I think is named from the “limit” of knowledge, as is fitting, covered and 
clothed that which it found hidden in the construction of our bodies.154 
 
If nature is the best teacher of modesty in comportment, then everyone should be able to achieve 
proper manners. By requiring his clergy to conform to his standards of etiquette, Ambrose asks 
them to follow the guidelines of nature. Even though this passage claims modesty as a natural 
trait, Ambrose’s personification of nature as a magistra, or teacher, hints that modesty must be 
learned.  
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 Despite Ambrose’s appeal to a natural education in modesty and comportment, the most 
common way that Roman young men learned to carry themselves well was through paideia. An 
elite Roman education in the fourth century used rhetoric as a tool to temper the imbalanced and 
inappropriate aspects of its students’ personalities. Peter Brown writes, “The careful control of 
breathing and the avoidance of inappropriate stances and discordant gestures were designed to 
transform an educated person into a tranquil figure whose voice and poise radiated harmonious 
authority.”155 While paideia emphasizes the mastery of rhetoric and literature, the education it 
provides in character development and physical comportment are equally important in its raising 
up of elite Roman men. The type of tranquility and poise that Ambrose expects from his clergy 
are curricular features of an education in paideia.  
 Ambrose’s requirement that church officers carry themselves with a modesty that is best 
learned through paideia is complicated when he expands the boundaries of his expectations. 
After mentioning that he is delighted, delectavit, to have offered such a long reflection on 
modesty, Ambrose makes it clear that he sees it as a universal virtue: Quae cum sit omnibus 
aetatibus personis temporibus et locis apta, tamen adulescentes iuvenalesque annos maxime 
decet, (“Although that thing is fitting for all ages, persons, times, and places, nevertheless it is 
most befitting to young men and youths”)156 By claiming that modesty and the learned etiquette 
that it entails are appropriate for everyone, regardless of status, Ambrose sets up conflicting 
expectations of his readers. Everyone should have modesty, but the most effective mode of 
acquiring it, paideia, is available only to elite Roman men. Ambrose’s sentiments of Christian 
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populism begin to break down when money and education become prerequisites for the 
acquisition of Christian virtue. 
 Ambrose drives home the connection between paideia and the qualifications for Christian 
leadership by emphasizing the importance of eloquent speech. If modesty can be argued for as a 
naturally occurring virtue, eloquence is clearly linked to education. In 1.226, Ambrose gives 
advice to clergy: Accedat tamen suavis sermo, ut conciliet sibi adfectum audientium gratumque 
se vel familiaribus vel civibus vel, si fieri potest, omnibus praebeat. (“Nevertheless add to these 
things smooth speech, so that each might gain for himself the goodwill of those listening and so 
that he might make himself agreeable either to his friends or to the citizens or, if it is able to be 
done, to all”).157 Ambrose views suavis sermo, or smooth speech, as an important characteristic 
for men of the church to have. Eloquence is not important simply because it is pleasant to listen 
to, but because it is the means by which clergy can consiliet, or draw to themselves, their 
listeners. For Ambrose, skill in speaking is an evangelistic tool that has immense potential to 
influence non-Christians. While some people may be naturally talented speakers, the most 
straightforward way for a main to grow in smoothness of speech is to be inducted into paideia. 
Even though Ambrose never explicit restricts church office to educated, and therefore elite, men, 
his insistence on the importance of the skills inculcated by paideia makes it clear that he 
envisions an ideal clergy made up of educated men. 
Conclusion 
 Ambrose’s expression of “Christian populism” is not straightforward. He does not always 
communicate a clear understanding of the plight of the impoverished, nor does he seem to realize 
that he excludes lower socioeconomic classes from participation in the clergy. Is his presentation 
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of himself as an egalitarian lover of the poor and disdainer of wealth just a front? While Peter 
Brown would likely argue that “Christian populism” in the fourth century primarily functions to 
bolster the already significant power of the Christian elite, to dismiss Ambrose as purely self-
interested seems unfair. At several points throughout his De Officiis Ambrose successfully lifts 
up the poor as valuable members of Roman society and, more importantly, the kingdom of God. 
He seems sincere in his rejection of wealth and advocacy of charitable giving, yet moments later 
he seems out of touch with the realities of poverty.  
 I suggest that Ambrose’s populist self-presentation is so multivalent because it reflects 
the tension between his Christian and elite Roman identities. As a privileged, highly educated 
man with wealth, political power, and spiritual authority, it is inevitable that Ambrose would 
stumble as he works to apply the Christian ethic of care for the poor to his life and writing. It is 
easy for someone with plenty to suggest that poverty is a spiritual boon, even with the best of 
intentions.  
 The tension between Ambrose’s identities is most apparent in his requirement of modest 
comportment and eloquent speech among clergy. He couches these standards in claims that 
nature is the best teacher of these skills, but this analogy only highlights the connection between 
etiquette, eloquence, and paideia. As much as Ambrose seeks to elevate the poor in his De 
Officiis, he cannot put aside his own socioeconomic class and its guidelines for appropriate 
behavior. Nothing in his text suggests that the restriction of church office is intentionally 
targeting lower class men, but the result is the same either way, despite the fact that such 
discrimination violates the ethic of Christian populism that Ambrose has carefully laid out in his 
De Officiis. Ambrose is a powerful and elite member of Roman society, but he is also a bishop 
for the people of Milan. The complex ways that he expresses an attitude of Christian populism, 
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as with his interactions with Cicero’s texts and the works of classical philosophers, reveal a 
tension between Ambrose’s dual identity as powerful Roman and influential Christian. 
 Because Ambrose is caught between these two identities, his work is easily evaluated in a 
one-sided way. If he is a Roman intellectual, his writing style is simplistic and unimpressive. If 
he is a Christian first and foremost, he is easily caught up in Cicero and the pagan tradition that 
he represents. When both competing identities are considered, Ambrose appears to be striving to 
find balance in his life and work. Instead of being incapable of writing in a Ciceronian way, 
Ambrose seeks to express an attitude that welcomes a broad readership, and rather than relying 
too much on pagan culture, he uses paideia as a familiar point of reference from which he can 
build a new Christian system of ethics. 
Ambrose is not alone in his navigation of both a Christian and social identity; each 
member of his congregation likewise grapples with what it means to be a Christian and a Roman 
citizen. All religion exists within a social context, and Ambrose’s work expresses a larger 
reckoning between Christianity and culture that is ongoing today. As Ambrose reworks Cicero, 
constructs a system of ethics both built upon and superior to that of his classical predecessors, 
and presents himself as a champion of the people, he performs his dual identity as both 
philosopher and Christian. Throughout his De Officiis, Ambrose seeks to attain a cohesive 
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